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Abstract—Today, the volume of evidence collected per case is
growing exponentially, to address this problem forensics investi-
gators are looking for investigation process with tools built on
new technologies like big data, cloud services and Deep Learning
(DL) techniques. Consequently, the accuracy of artifacts found
also relies on the performance of techniques used, especially DL
models. Recently, Deep Neural Nets (DNN) have achieved state of
the art performance in the tasks of classification and recognition.
In the context of digital forensics, DNN has been applied in
the domains of cybercrime investigation such as child abuse
investigations, malware classification, steganalysis and image
forensics. However, the robustness of DNN models in the context
of digital forensics is never studied before. Hence, in this research,
we design and implement a domain independent Adversary
Testing Framework (ATF) to test security robustness of black-box
DNN’s. By using ATF, we also methodically test a commercially
available DNN service used in forensic investigations and bypass
the detection, where published methods fail in control settings.
Index Terms—Digital Forensics, Deep Learning, Adversarial
Attacks, Adversary Testing Framework, Testing Forensics tools
I. INTRODUCTION
Broadly, digital forensics investigation process consists of
- Identify, collect and acquire evidence, examining and ana-
lyzing the collected evidence and finally, document and report
observations without compromising data integrity. Today, the
amount of material presented for digital forensic examination
has increased significantly, this has left many police forces
and organizations facing a large backlog of examination [1].
In addition, due to the availability of cheap storage, increasing
adoption of IPv6, using of cloud services, and increased use of
mobile devices for a single case, forensic data today becomes
Big Data1 in the Internet of Things(IoT) environment [2].
Hence, recently digital investigators have applied big data
technology, cloud-based forensics services, as well as Machine
Learning (ML) and deep Learning techniques to collect and
analyze efficiently a large volume of heterogeneous evidence
[3].
In fact, machine learning algorithms such as logistics regres-
sion, support vector machines, decision trees have been used
for malware classification and forensics artifact correlation
[4] [5]. In audio forensics, unsupervised learning techniques
have been applied to separate voice from background noise.
Clustering, outlier detection, and dimensionality reduction
1http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/big-data
methods are used for analyzing of network data [6] [7] and
financial fraud analysis [8] [9].
The recent success of Deep Neural Nets (DNN) in the
tasks of classification and recognition have led to widespread
adoption and deployment of DNN in security and safety-
critical systems. It is no longer a promising but immature
technology, as DNN systems have reached close to human-
level performance on unseen data. In the context of digital
forensics DNN is proposed for steganalysis [10], video forgery
detection [11], image forensics2 and commercially used in
digital forensic tools.
Security related applications based on ML and DNN models
have to take into account adversarial settings and scenarios.
An intelligent and adaptive adversary can submit a carefully
crafted input to a classification system to purposely undermine
its performance. It is now acknowledged that DNN exhibit
multiple vulnerabilities and are prone to various attacks both
targeted and untargeted [13]. In order to allow successful
adaption and trusting of DNN outputs in digital forensics
settings, there is a need for systematic evaluation of the
robustness of DNN models used in forensics tools. However,
to the best of our knowledge, there is no existing study which
tests the reliability, robustness, and stability of digital forensics
tool which uses DNN models in the literature.
The key challenges of testing security robustness of black-
box deep learning systems are two-fold: (1) how to generate
inputs which uncover different erroneous behaviors, and (2)
how to adapt black-box attacks to different threat models and
adversary resistant settings. Hence, this paper describes how
we design and build Adversary Testing Framework (ATF)
to address both challenges. In summary, our contributions
include:
• We extend the taxonomy of threat models for testing
security robustness of black-box DNN.
• We define standard empirical metrics to measure the
effectiveness of attacks on black-box DNN.
• We design and implement Adversary Testing Framework
(ATF) for testing robustness of real-world hosted black
box DNN models.
• We carry out the practical black-box attack using ATF
against Digital Forensics API - Image Analyzer and show
2https://www.guidancesoftware.com/app/Image-Analyzer-Day-Free-Trial
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that these models can be bypassed with high confidence.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Multiple attacks have been demonstrated against DNN
models in controlled settings. Recent work also illustrates
the possibility of attacks on deployed systems such as ML
as a service cloud applications [12] in laboratory settings.
Latest survey [13] summarizes different attacks published in
the literature and Table I captures different attacks on DNN’s
in non-image domains.
A qualitative taxonomy for the threat models [14]–[16]
against machine learning systems places the attacks in fol-
lowing axes:
• Influence: can be either causative or exploratory. A
causative influence can affect the learning process, while
an exploratory attack only deals with a trained classifier.
Attacks that affect the learning process have also been
categorized as poisoning and attacks that are used only
at test time have also been described as evasion attacks.
• Security Violations: can be integrity related when the
adversary can cause misclassification of attacks to appear
as normal, availability related when the misclassification
are so many that the system becomes unusable and
privacy violation, when the adversary obtains information
from the learner, compromising the secrecy or privacy of
the system’s users.
• Specificity: can be targeted when it focuses on specific
misclassification or indiscriminate where it does not mat-
ter which classes are being misclassified.
• Complexity of the attack: which ranges from simple
confidence reduction to complete source/target misclassi-
fication.
• Knowledge of the attacker: which ranges from knowl-
edge about architecture, training tools and data to just
knowledge of a few samples. If the attacker knows
anything regarding the architecture, the training data or
the features used, the attack is considered a white-box
attack. If the adversary’s knowledge is limited to Oracle
attacks or she has only access to a limited number of
samples, the attack is considered a black-box attack.
In a security-sensitive setting, attacker goal is not only to
compromise security of the system but also stay undetected
i.e. not raise any alerts or errors in the underlying system.
We propose following additional goals for an attacker when
designing threat model for a security sensitive black-box DNN:
• Error Sensitivity - Attacker has to avoid any error raised
by underlying detection system.
• Alert suppressing - Attacker should not raise an alert in
the system which is under attack.
• Query rate Limiting - Adversary has to respect query
limit imposed by API when attacking a remotely hosted
DNN API.
• Persistence of attack - Black-box models can be re-
trained with new data and replaced with the new model,
a successful attack has to survive retraining and replace-
ment of models.
TABLE I: Summary of black box attacks on DNN’s in non
image domains
Domain Type Targeted/Non-targeted
Google Video API’s [17] Black box Targeted
Face Recognition Systems [18] Black box Non-targeted
Text classification systems [19] Black box Non-targeted
• Multiple sub models - In a black-box setting, output to
a query can be generated by multiple sub-models, the
attacker has to fool all or sub-set of models to achieve
his goal.
In order to measure the effectiveness of black-box attacks,
we use the following metrics.
• Attack success rate. The fraction of samples that meets
the adversary’s goal: f(xadv) 6= y for un-targeted attacks
and f(xadv) = T for targeted attacks with target T [20].
• Average distortion. We also evaluate the average distor-
tion for adversarial examples using average L2 distance
between the benign samples and the adversarial ones:
∆(Xadv,X) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 ‖(Xadv)i − (X)i‖2
where N is the number of samples. This metric allows
us to compare the average distortion for attacks which
achieve similar attack success rates, and therefore infer
which one is stealthier.
• Root Mean Square Deviation. Distortion is measured by
root mean square deviation (RMSD), which is computed
as
dev(x?, x) =
√∑
i
(x?i − xi)2/N (1)
where x? and x are the vector representations of distorted
image and the original image respectively, N is the
dimensionality of x and x?, and xi denotes the pixel value
of the i-th dimension of x, which is within range [0, 255].
• Number of queries. Query based black-box attacks make
queries to the target model, and this metric may affect
the cost of mounting the attack. This is an important
consideration when attacking real-world systems which
have costs associated with the number of queries made.
III. ADVERSARY TESTING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we provide a general overview of, our
Adversary Testing Framework(ATF) for systematically testing
black-box DNNs. The main components of are shown in
Figure 1.
Threat Model Adapter. Threat Model Adapter(TMA) con-
sists of various components which probe the black-box DNN’s
defenses. Depending on adversary goal, domain, and defenses
in place, TMA iteratively crafts attack samples to bypass the
security of black-box DNN.
• Feature Influence Calculator(FIC). We define Feature
Influence as a set of features in input space which are
attributed to the prediction of a DNN. We use Inte-
grated Gradients(IG) [21] technique to calculate feature
Influence of remote black-box DNN. Since gradients are
Fig. 1: Adversary Testing Framework
not available we use a surrogate model and exploit the
transferability to craft the attack samples. IG is calculated
by aggregating the gradients along the inputs that fall
on the straight line between the baseline and the input.
As shown in equation 2 integrated gradients method
identifies features which define class boundaries for a
specific model. The integral of integrated gradients can
be efficiently approximated via a summation. We sum the
gradients at points occurring at sufficiently small intervals
along the straight line path from the baseline x′ to the
input x. For a given input, first, we get feature activations
for each model in the model bank. Next, we use query
limiter to choose predefined percent of activated features
which are found in the majority of models.
IGapproxi (x) = (xi − x′i)× Σmk=1
∂F (x′+ km×(x−x
′)))
∂xi
× 1m
(2)
Here m is the number of steps in the Riemman approxi-
mation of the integral.
• Rate/Query Limiter. The major drawback of the existing
black-box attacks is that the number of queries needed per
adversarial sample is large. For an input with dimension
d, the number of queries will be exactly 2d. In security-
sensitive setting, the number of queries available to an
attacker is limited. The functionality of query limiter is to
reduce the number of queries the adversary has to make.
We use feature grouping technique to reduce the number
of queries.
In each iteration of Algorithm 1, let there by k models in
the model bank. For each model m we calculate most
activated features ym for input x using IG, this will
generate m feature vectors ym. Now, choose only those
features for which multiple models have activated the
same feature and cross the threshold n.
Algorithm 1: Query limiting using FIC
Require: x, k, y, n
1: for i← 1 to k do
2: yk = IG for modelk for input x
3: end for
4: select features from yk which are active for
count(modelk) >n .
• Sensitivity Prober. Prober main functionality is to test
black-box model sensitivity towards the random noise,
random feature perturbations, and input transformations
like feature compression. It also calculates different met-
rics as described in Section II to generate baselines for
the attack.
• Error Recorder. In real life scenario, black-box models
generate different types of errors which can be useful
to attacker depending on the threat model. Errors can
include configurations errors, system generated errors and
run-time errors. Errors like system generated and runtime
errors may expose underlying defenses used by black-
box DNN which can help an attacker to achieve his goal.
The error recorder main function is to record any errors
generated by black-box DNN and map them to threat
model under test.
• Attack Selector. Given the threat model definition, errors
generated by DNN, and sensitivity parameters attack
selector selects the best attack suitable for the black-box
DNN. It also tunes parameters for a given attack.
Model Bank and Attack Generator. Ideally, a black-
box attack can start with a random input and iteratively run
different attacks to discover decision boundaries of underlying
black-box DNN. But in real life scenarios, the number of
queries available is limited. So, we use an ensemble of
models for generating adversarial samples that transfer well
to the target model. A collection of DNN models which have
different architecture, weights, parameters and follow different
training methodology are found in the model bank. Given a
clean input, threat model constraints, attack generator creates
adversarial samples to test black-box DNN.
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section, first, we describe real-life black-box DNN’s
API’s that we used to evaluate ATF and then present an
overview of ATF’s performance.
A. Image-Analyzer
Image-Analyzer3 provides commercial API to forensics and
computer security companies4. Image analyzer API is used
for automating flagging offensive content in image forensics,
evidence gathering, email and web content. When an image
is uploaded to advertised API endpoint it returns a JSON
response with probability scores for each category as described
below.
• Terrorism Category - Images containing terrorist mili-
tants, beheadings, executions, propaganda, acts of terror-
ism, flags and insignia.
• Weapons Category - Images containing handheld
weapons such as rifles, machine guns, handguns, knives,
swords, grenade launchers and people holding firearms.
• Pornography Category - Images that contain commer-
cial pornography, amateur pornography, sexting, selfies,
3https://www.guidancesoftware.com/app/Image-Analyzer-Day-Free-Trial
4https://ecom.image-analyzer.com/knowledgebase.php
nudity, sex acts, greyscale pornographic images, sexually
explicit cartoons and manga.
• Gore Category - Images containing graphic violence,
bloody wounds, accident victims, Beatings, mutilation,
decapitation and other images that contain blood and guts
• Drugs Category - Images containing illegal drugs, drug
use, drug paraphernalia, plants and symbols relating to
drugs
It is possible for an image to return high probabilities
for multiple categories. There are 24 error codes produced
by remote API (Table II). The higher the probability for a
particular category the more likely the image composition
matches that category. The default recommended threshold is
50%, this will provide high detection with false positives of
approximately 1-2%. Increasing the threshold will decrease
the false positives and detection rate. Lowering the threshold
will increase the false positives and detection rate.
B. Threat Model
• Rate Limiting - Image analyzer has a query limiting for
test accounts of maximum 10,000 queries per user.
• Rejection rate - Image analyzer has a strong rejection rate
for known black-box attacks as seen by sensitivity prober.
• Model updates - As advertised in API documentation,
models are updated frequently with new training data.
• Errors - System error -25 in table II can alert the system
administrator of attacker activity.
The goal of the adversary is to bypass the image content
detection engine and achieve zero detection. Bypassing the
engine here means for a given image in normal settings
probability score of the image is greater than the threshold
when compared to attack image with similar content the
probability score is lesser than the threshold. In an attacker
aware setting system, administrators or maintainers will review
both alerts and errors raised by the system. In order to achieve
zero detection, the adversary should not only raise any alerts
but also errors in the system.
Error Code Type Description
-7 Runtime Invalid Command.
-9 Runtime Invalid Image Data
-10 Runtime Invalid Category Id/s
-11 System Cannot decode the image
-12 System Unable to load Image Reader
-15 System Unexpected error, please try again.
-16 System Error as returned by the scanning functionality
-17 Runtime Invalid / Empty image URL
-20 Runtime Database Error
-21 Runtime Empty Image data from URL
-22 System Failed to load IASSL library
-23 System Error in daemon service
-25 System Error by background service.
-26 Runtime Invalid JSON.
TABLE II: System and Run time error codes returned by
Image Analyzer API
ATF Component Parameters
Model Bank Inception v3 [22], Resnet 50, Resnet 101,
Resnet 152 [23], VGG 16 [24], Adv. trained
Inception v3, Adv.ens. trained Resnet 50
[25]
Sensitivity Prober Gaussian Noise, JPEG Compression, Ran-
dom Noise
Error Recorder -25 System Error
Rate Limiter <1000 API calls
Attack Selector FGSM, I-FGSM, C&W, JSMA
Attack Generator FGSM-  = 16/256, I-FGSM-20 Iteration,
C&W and, JSMA (Default values from
cleverhans library)
Feature Influence Calcula-
tor
Integrated Gradients with 300 Iterations,
threshold- 3
TABLE III: Different parameters used in ATF for attacking
Image Analyzer API
Fig. 2: Probability scores of each category vs CDF of Root
Mean Square Deviation, Green and Red regions indicate
detection and bypassing regions respectively. Adversary has
to stay in red region to avoid detection.Threshold is set to
default value(50)
C. Results
We evaluated Image analyzer API with 400 images with
label ”assault rifle, assault gun”, these images were randomly
drawn from train data of Imagenet. Due to sensitive nature
of categories like terrorism, we did not test the robustness
of API w.r.t. other categories. Table III summarizes different
parameters used in Adversary Testing Framework. As shown
in Table IV attack images generated by different models failed
to bypass the detection system. The reasons remote API was
able to detect these attacks is either it is trained to detect these
published attacks or attack was not transferable with default
FGM I-FGM C&W JSMA ATF
ResNet-152 4% 5% 7.5% 3.5% 97%
ResNet-101 3.54% 6.5% 10.2% 4.1% 95%
ResNet-50 13% 17% 9 % 5% 94 %
VGG-16 10.2% 12.5% 14% 12% 84 %
Adv.Train Inception V3 5% 10% 8.2 % 11% 96%
InceptionV3 2% 7% ErrorCode-25 13% 97%
Ensemble Trained ResNet-50 ErrorCode-25 ErrorCode-25 ErrorCode-25 ErrorCode-25 94%
TABLE IV: Different Attack Images generated using the model bank. The Index column equal model name which is used to
generate attack images The cell (i, j) indicates the percent of images out of 400 which bypassed detection for particular attack
and model combination.
Query-based attack Attack success No. of queries % of samples generated Error(-25)
Iter. Finite Diff. 18 >10000 72
Iter. Gradient Estimation 55 7600 45
ATF 97 856 3
TABLE V: Comparison of untargeted query-based black-box attack methods. All results are for attacks using the 400 samples
from the Imagenet ”assault rifle, assault gun” dataset on and with an L∞ and perturbation of  = 32.
parameters. In future, we want to explore with parameter
tuning instead of default parameters.
We also observed that attack images raised ”backend service
error”. This behavior suggests that model detects adversarial
samples but does not recover true class of the image. When
random noise image is submitted to API we observe no error
generated, suggesting that model is sensitive to noise. As noted
in Figure 2 the probability for each category drops as distortion
(RMSD) increases. Table VI summarizes probability changes
of top category of an image w.r.t. to selectively changing
pixels using integrated gradient method. We compare ATF with
iterative finite differences and iterative gradient estimation
attacks [26] non-targeted black-box attacks in Table V, ATF
outperforms other attacks in constraint settings.
V. DISCUSSION
The popularity of DNN has led to an explosion in the
number of DNN libraries, frameworks, and services. A service
provider can use in-house infrastructure, data to train a DNN
model or outsource model creation to a cloud service such
as Amazon ML5 and AutoML6. Services developed on top of
these models are available to end users for automating tasks
which may be security critical.
Non Expert users have no insights into how these models
were trained, implemented and how trustworthy are the plat-
forms hosting them. Interpreting outputs of DNN are nontrivial
due to the complexity involved. We argue that any framework
which tests the security robustness of a black-box DNN has
to answer following questions.
As a future work, we want to extend ATF to provide the
testing methodology for answering each question summarized
in Table VII
5https://aws.amazon.com/amazon-ai/
6https://cloud.google.com/automl/
Image Prob of Top category,Perturbation %
Weapons:99.99715, 2.2263
Weapons:98.24705, 3.6469
Weapons:36.24675, 3.7806
Weapons:0.133139357611, 4.3276
TABLE VI: Images , probabilities returned by image analyzer
API for Top category and Percent of Perturbing Influence
Pixels.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we designed and implemented ATF, a domain-
independent framework for systematically testing security
robustness of black-box DNN with varying threat models
and adversary goals. We introduced a new method, Feature
Influence Calculator, for bypassing black-box DNN. we tested
ATF with a DNN tool used in digital forensics operating
in constraint settings. As a future work, we want to extend
the ATF to test the robustness of DNN algorithms used in
other security domains mainly malware classification, mobile
authentication, mobile cloud forensics [27], anomaly detection,
Characteristics of
DNN
Implication
Non-transparency The structure of a trained ML model is difficult for a human to understand. Is the
architecture, weights, and implementation of the model open and reproducible.
Training scenarios Does the data set has enough representation of all classes. Is the training set poisoned?
Does the training set have inherited bias?
Error rate A trained ML model does not guarantee correctness and has a known estimated error
rate. Are the real error rates model experiences close to development process estimate?
Does the error rate increase over time?
Instability The structure of a trained ML model is emergent and may change arbitrarily even for
small changes in training. How much stable outputs are when the training set changes?
Privacy & Anti-
Discrimination
Is model resistant to Information leak and fair w.r.t. predictions?
TABLE VII: Characteristics of machine learning based implementations.
on-chip DNN models and closed source software which are
relevant for Digital Forensics community. We are going to
analyze the impact of the use of DNN tools on ISO 27041,
27042 standards and also propose recommendations to these
standards to accommodate technologies like DNN.
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